DeleHarry
Jose Dominguez
and how about Patrick Minford, is he as thick as pigsh!t too?
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Politics, politics, politics
- Thread starter markysimmo
- Start date
and how about Patrick Minford, is he as thick as pigsh!t too?
That's your motivation I have yet to see this being championed by those in a position to make a difference. In fact those in power are more likely to continue with the status quo, don't you think?
milo
Jack L. Jones
He's not thick but he is not a trade expert and his assumptions and findings have been widely criticised
https://www.economist.com/news/brit...rease-68-most-economists-say-brexit-will-hurt
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/brexit-minford-economics_uk_599ae35be4b0e8cc855ee180
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/...leading-eu-uk-trade-deal-tariff-a7691271.html
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessrevi...or-brexit-manage-to-defy-the-laws-of-gravity/
Even if you overlook these basic failings, by his own admission, his proposed approach would end manufacturing in the UK.
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Gutter Boy
Tim Sherwood
There are some signs:
- There's the new industrial strategy
- Universities will now be assessed/funded 25% on their industrial engagement and 60% on their academic output (this was suddenly changed from 20%:65% last week)
- New Medical School are being planned to increase the capacity to train homegrown doctors, rather than having to import them
To me they are all subtle signs of a move away from neo-liberalism to a more strategically-planned in-the-national-interest economy.
Gutter Boy
Tim Sherwood
Blimey, Spain is going all Franco again: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-41331152
At least here you know that there's only so far the authorities would go to subvert democracy. I'm pretty confident we will let Scotland and Northern Ireland go when they reach their 50%s.
At least here you know that there's only so far the authorities would go to subvert democracy. I'm pretty confident we will let Scotland and Northern Ireland go when they reach their 50%s.
milo
Jack L. Jones
This is nonsense GB. This whole twitter thread is worth reading but I have jumped straight to the bit on doctor numbers and training
The fact of the matter is that the freetrade Brexit-ultras support it because it will make the NHS and welfare state unaffordable.
I really think you will be disappointed and I certainly wouldn't base my views on the current Brexit strategy on this outcome. I see the main driver by a lot of right wing backers the reduction in workers rights and I think we will see a similar amount of European low wage labour force but without the need to give them the same benefits / Tax credits as UK citizens. This is what UKIP (farrage) & right of the tory party.
Would like to see your outcome just think its really unrealistic at the moment.
Gutter Boy
Tim Sherwood
It might be a long term initiative, but I do know specifically that the government are heavily incentivising 6-8 universities who don't currently have medical schools (but are strong on allied health), to open them.
In the short-to-medium term, of course, that's why you have a work permit system - to prioritise such highly-skilled workers.
Gutter Boy
Tim Sherwood
I see the current priority for Brexit as getting power back to Westminster
In 2022 we can then decide who to give it to. The repatriation of powers will allow Corbyn to completely renationalise rail and energy for example. Or we can go down Liam Fox's Singapore route. But 2022 is the key moment for the future direction of the UK, not now. As assassins, the Right probably won't carry the crown
Gutter Boy
Tim Sherwood
I just have faith in British resolve, character, resourcefulness and zero flimflam tolerance.
DubaiSpur
Ian Walker
Speaking from a Canadian perspective, there's little motivation or incentive to try cobbling together a post-American TPP. The lynchpin of mostly free access to American markets was what underpinned most of the give-and-take in the TPP as a whole, including the gargantuan tasks of trying to get the Japanese to lower their tariffs on critical sectors and adopting a unified IP standard. Without the potential market of 350m consumers to draw upon, the TPP is dead from an economic standpoint - and, worse still, doubly deceased in terms of the geopolitical motivations behind it. No trade deals are ever absent of geostrategic motivations for their establishment and maintenance, and the TPP did not have any once the United States withdrew - the entire affair was meant to construct an American-led alternative to Chinese domination of the economic narrative across East and Southeast Asia, and without the backing of Washington, that endeavour is destined to fail. Canberra, Ottawa and Tokyo are no match for Beijing, and the addition of London to that motley grouping won't alter anything in that regard.
It was never a pure trade deal - no trade deal ever is. And it's dead now, so no point hankering after it unless Cheeto expires in office and Mike Pence magically puts it back on the table again. Once upon a time, Britain could have been the lynchpin around which the political will of a grouping of nations like the TPP11 could have been melded into a coherent trade deal with the geostrategic heft to withstand the tides of Asian geopolitics. But that time died when Britain permanently closed the door on a presence East of Suez, and the likes of Canberra and Ottawa now go where Washington goes, not where London would like them to go.
Similar thing with the EU, funnily enough. The geopolitical motivation behind the EU was always pretty transparent - preserving European geostrategic relevance in an age where the likes of India and China (both individual nations larger than the *entire* continent of Europe, both in terms of territory and populations) would quickly catch up and then surpass individual European nations as the go-to economic engines of a world already dominated by the United States. It was an idea that hinged on roughly equally-sized Western European nations (the UK, France, Spain, Germany, Italy) jointly preserving their relevance by creating a supranational bloc that could match and surpass its rising rivals in Asia and its existing rival in North America.
But the UK opted out of that project - fair enough, I don't have the right to judge that decision because I'm not presently in the UK, and it was (however shakily) the people's will. That deserves respect. But the reality of the situation has to be understood by decision-makers in Whitehall and by the British public at large - the geostrategic relevance of the United Kingdom in a post-Brexit world is almost nil. And big ideas like the TPP cannot be pushed from London, in light of that fact. The UK's domestic market is not large enough to merit making big tariff concessions for, and British power projection is non-existent, so no Asian or Pacific Rim partner will see London as a substitute for Washington when it comes to the political heft behind deals like the TPP.
Gutter Boy
Tim Sherwood
Really interesting
I thought Japan though had really picked up the baton of TPP (I've read things like this before: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/09/08/commentary/japan-commentary/tpp-global-power/#.WcKDeU2ou70)?
Japan is the 3rd biggest economy in the world, Britain the 5th, Canada 10th, Australia 13th etc. Combined that's bigger than the EU and not far off China and the US. I never imagined the UK leading it like America would have, rather just giving it critical mass again. Both Canada and Australia have encouraged us to do this, as a way of getting the quickest possible deals with them (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business...da-urge-uk-join-ready-made-trade-deals-nafta/).
To my eyes also the strength of the TPP is that it’s a partnership of different economies. There are developed and developing countries. Those with raw materials, those with manufacturing and those with services. It's not just rich countries swapping services and creaming off profit, it's purposeful trade of things you have for things you need.
People possibly - those in power seem to like the status quo.
Gutter Boy
Tim Sherwood
May is a one-nation conservative and Corbyn a full blown socialist. Both are a move away from the raw neo-liberalism of George Osborne
DubaiSpur
Ian Walker
Shinzo Abe was quoted late last year as saying that the TPP was essentially meaningless without the United States, and I think his (probably unintended) forthrightness reflects most of the conventional thinking on the subject at the moment.
The sizes of the economies involved are only a part of what made the TPP a viable proposition for its partners - and maybe not even the biggest part. As the article you linked points out, in the grand scheme of Asian geopolitics, the TPP was an attempt to limit China's ongoing attempts to build a parallel network of economic and diplomatic institutions that would eventually supplant U.S-sponsored institutions and trading relationships. Japan's geostrategic aims were closely tied to Washington's in this regard, which is why they were amenable to the prospect in the first place - the rapid trajectory towards regional hegemony that Beijing has experienced over the last two decades forced Tokyo to reconsider the importance of its remaining tariffs and protectionist measures within its national strategy.
To effectively fulfill its geostrategic purpose, the TPP was meant to draw in Asian countries like Malaysia and Vietnam, and ensconce them into trade partnerships with the United States and Japan that would act as a bulwark against growing Chinese attempts to exercise outright economic, military and diplomatic dominance in the East and South China Seas. The economic purpose of the deal was to liberalize trade,create common administrative and legal frameworks and generate growth across all its participating nations, of course, but the geostrategic element was equally important - to Tokyo, to Washington and to regional capitals hoping to stave off the prospect of being dominated by Beijing. And both the economic and geostrategic elements of the deal were completely reliant on the United States - the economic concessions and gains made by all parties across the long negotiating period were *entirely* predicated on gaining mostly free access to the 350m relatively wealthy, active consumers within the United States. And, likewise, the geostrategic aims of the deal were predicated on certain things. Namely, the comprehensive national power at the disposal of the United States in the Asia Pacific - the United States Seventh Fleet stationed at Yokosuka, the 40,000 U.S military personnel stationed across Japan as a whole, the Arleigh-Burke class destroyers conducting Freedom of Navigation patrols across the First Island Chain, the litany of U.S air assets at bases across Japan, South Korea and the Pacific Islands and the combined diplomatic, economic and military infrastructure across Asia that would allow Washington and its allies to confront Beijing with the threat of *forcing* compliance were the nations involved in the TPP to be threatened by Beijing for their participation or unwillingness to accede to Chinese aims in Asia.
As I said, every trade deal is *more* than just a trade deal. With the E.U, the geostrategic aim was to unite Europe as a bulwark against the prospect of strategic irrelevance - and with the TPP, it was to combat the rise of China as a power seeking regional hegemony in East Asia. If either Britain or Japan were to restart the TPP as it was originally negotiated, one of them would have to step into the shoes of the United States in order to keep the economic and geostrategic logic behind the deal alive. And neither is capable of doing so - especially the UK. As I mentioned, the UK's domestic market isn't big enough to make opening up an attractive prospect to Japan or other participating nations - and Britain has very little to offer the countries involved in the deal in terms of sector-specific expertise needed by all members, whether developed or developing. And from a geostrategic perspective, the UK can't give critical mass to anything anywhere - what Hanoi wants from a TPP-level partner, for example, is a willingness to stand up to Beijing and to protect Hanoi's sovereignty with force if necessary. Would Britain be willing to stand up to China to protect Vietnam's claims in the South China Sea ? London doesn't even whimper when Beijing cracks down in Hong Kong. And would it be willing to employ force to dissuade China from disrupting the trading relationships created by the TPP? The Type 45s can't even chug into the Persian Gulf without breaking down, there are almost no British assets on station anywhere east of Suez, and the whole prospect of the UK independently standing up to the juggernaut that is the PLA is utterly laughable - that sort of potency died in 1945, and has never returned since.
Only America could fill those roles. Which is why the TPP sans America is just a pipe dream, more or less. That's not to say that the countries involved couldn't slowly, painfully try to create a new deal with far fewer concessions and much-reduced geostrategic ambitions, but the UK can't really give critical mass to anything, is my point. I don't think you meant it that way, but my frustration is that a lot of people in the UK seem to think in that way - and that's just *wrong*.
DubaiSpur
Ian Walker
And, by the way, if anyone thinks I'm unnecessarily talking the UK down, that really isn't my intention - it's as much a mistake to underrate the UK's potential in a post-Brexit world as it is to overestimate it. In time, after the situation stabilizes and Britain reorients itself towards being a nation quick on its feet in terms of exploiting trade opportunities, things will look somewhat better in terms of London's international clout. There's a place in the world for Britain as a responsible middle power with fairly open, tariff-free trading relationships with the likes of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (possibly even with free movement between those countries, although the United States would voice some concerns about that extending to Canada). And for a Britain that trades with India and the other emerging powers on a fairly non-discriminatory basis, maintaining its links to the new centres of economic growth.
But to become that sort of nation requires an acknowledgment of the world as it is. And the world as it is simply is not a place where Britain can stride into the halls of power and demand one-way relationships, or be excessively picky about what it gives up in trade deals, or harbor delusions as to slotting into deals like the TPP - massive, world-spanning trade deals that took years to negotiate and involved the push-and-pull of powers far more integral to the world order than the UK at this time. Britain does not hold the upper hand when negotiating with New Delhi - they are larger and more geostrategically relevant than the United Kingdom, and have many options outside the UK that will give them what they want if London is too recalcitrant on Indian demands relating to immigration, freedom of movement and access for its own firms. The UK cannot slot into the TPP11 in America's place - the idea is too ludicrous to think about. And even the CANZUK deal will require a lot more in terms of concessions on the part of the UK than the British public seem to imagine - Ottawa and Canberra won't go easy in terms of their demands in any potential deal just because of our historical links and our shared head of state.
For better or worse, being in the EU gave the UK more bargaining power within a large, lucrative bloc in terms of trading *with the rest of the world* - shorn of that shared attractiveness, the UK is now distinctly weaker in terms of attractiveness to the rest of the world, even if it will now have more control over who it negotiates with and what it can offer. No amount of British grit and stiff upper lips will change that - it is the nature of a world slowly evolving towards a multipolar order (as it stands). To secure the future I outlined, of Britain as a responsive middle power, that realization needs to happen. And a more thorough accounting of what Britain needs to offer to its potential trading partners has to be impressed upon the British public - since Britain cannot get involved with TPP-esque trade deals in terms of the geostrategic aspects that come with them (i.e, it is currently too impotent to contribute to the geopolitical aims of countries forging such grand deals), it will need to offer a lot more to remain an attractive trading partner to countries that will otherwise see no benefit to opening themselves up to London in return.
If that realisation hits the British public, then governments will be more comfortable with making the concessions that will secure the post-Brexit trade deals that the UK *can* use its influence and heft to finalize. That's the path to Britain as a post-Brexit middle power. Otherwise, the 'take back control' lot will be the very same chaps who will hamstring the UK's ability to secure its place in the world post-Brexit.
But to become that sort of nation requires an acknowledgment of the world as it is. And the world as it is simply is not a place where Britain can stride into the halls of power and demand one-way relationships, or be excessively picky about what it gives up in trade deals, or harbor delusions as to slotting into deals like the TPP - massive, world-spanning trade deals that took years to negotiate and involved the push-and-pull of powers far more integral to the world order than the UK at this time. Britain does not hold the upper hand when negotiating with New Delhi - they are larger and more geostrategically relevant than the United Kingdom, and have many options outside the UK that will give them what they want if London is too recalcitrant on Indian demands relating to immigration, freedom of movement and access for its own firms. The UK cannot slot into the TPP11 in America's place - the idea is too ludicrous to think about. And even the CANZUK deal will require a lot more in terms of concessions on the part of the UK than the British public seem to imagine - Ottawa and Canberra won't go easy in terms of their demands in any potential deal just because of our historical links and our shared head of state.
For better or worse, being in the EU gave the UK more bargaining power within a large, lucrative bloc in terms of trading *with the rest of the world* - shorn of that shared attractiveness, the UK is now distinctly weaker in terms of attractiveness to the rest of the world, even if it will now have more control over who it negotiates with and what it can offer. No amount of British grit and stiff upper lips will change that - it is the nature of a world slowly evolving towards a multipolar order (as it stands). To secure the future I outlined, of Britain as a responsive middle power, that realization needs to happen. And a more thorough accounting of what Britain needs to offer to its potential trading partners has to be impressed upon the British public - since Britain cannot get involved with TPP-esque trade deals in terms of the geostrategic aspects that come with them (i.e, it is currently too impotent to contribute to the geopolitical aims of countries forging such grand deals), it will need to offer a lot more to remain an attractive trading partner to countries that will otherwise see no benefit to opening themselves up to London in return.
If that realisation hits the British public, then governments will be more comfortable with making the concessions that will secure the post-Brexit trade deals that the UK *can* use its influence and heft to finalize. That's the path to Britain as a post-Brexit middle power. Otherwise, the 'take back control' lot will be the very same chaps who will hamstring the UK's ability to secure its place in the world post-Brexit.
milo
Jack L. Jones
None of this has anything to do with the EU though. The shortage of doctors and nurses is down to successive British governments and Brexit will make a bad situation worse (at least in the short to medium term).
Gutter Boy
Tim Sherwood
It does. It's been cheap and easy to import them, so you don't train homegrown ones or incentivise that career path through pay and conditions. It's how neo-liberalism works - move the cheapest labour around to maximise profit, with no concern for society or humanity.
No British government could do anything about that because of freedom of movement and EU competition laws.
I agree it will get worse for a bit, because we've been so structurally damaged. But investment in skills and a high skilled work permit system will correct things in the medium-to-long term.