The Congo War known outside the United States as the ‘Central African Wars’ was a series of interconnected conflicts spread across central Africa from the late 1950s to early 1970s. The phrase ‘Congo War’ refers specifically to the military involvement of the United States in the region from February 1964 to December 1968.
Beginning in the late 1950s, the Soviet Union had identified Africa, now in the throes of the chaos of decolonisation, as a fertile breeding ground for communist ideology. The Soviet Union envisioned the creation of a Marxist bloc stretching from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. In a practical sense, this Marxist bloc would provide the Soviets with the raw materials and manpower they would need to sustain their isolated economy.
From 1958-1960, the Soviets tried to provide arms and training to the Mau-Mau insurgents fighting against British colonial rule in Kenya. Though the operation ultimately came too late to change the outcome of the war, the Soviets gained valuable knowledge of how insurgency conflicts in Africa could be organised and fought.
When, in the early 1960s, many African nations gained independence amid the withdrawal of the old European powers, the Soviets were quick to provide both military and political support to the new governments of these regions. Tanzania and Zambia quickly aligned themselves with the East as Western aid and recognition was slow and ineffectual.
These developments alarmed the colonial/ minority administrations in South Africa, (Southern) Rhodesia and Portuguese Angola/ Mocambique. Similarly, this caused the United States to adjust its view towards the continent. While the US prided itself on its anti-colonial routes, many US officials harboured real fears that the withdrawal of the colonial powers would provide the Soviets with an abundance of friends in the third world. Already in what had been French Indo-China, the US found itself being drawn into an insurgency conflict against communist backed guerrillas.
In both South-East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, the US feared a domino effect. The USA’s ultimate concern was that if Zambia and then Rhodesia were to fall to the Soviets, South Africa and its valuable deposits of Uranium, Platinum and Gold would be vulnerable to Soviet expansion.
Throughout the early 1960s, the US worked in vain with its European allies to design a ‘staggered’ approach to decolonisation but the colonial powers, still reeling from the Second World War, saw little option but to withdraw as quickly as possible.
When Democrat Lyndon B Johnson took power after Kennedy’s assassination, he found himself at a crossroads. Ultimately, Johnson wanted democratic majority governments in power in Africa but he did not want these democratic governments coming at the cost of expanding the Soviet sphere of influence.
Johnson was nervous to provide support to either Portugal (currently engaged in a colonial war in Angola and Mozambique), South Africa or Rhodesia. But at the fore of Johnson’s mind was the problem of the Congo. Arguably the country to suffer the most under colonial rule, the Congo was also experiencing one of the most chaotic periods of decolonisation and the Soviets were quick to notice.
Principally, the region of Katanga was quickly establishing itself as a semi-autonomous state within which the Soviets could establish a communist government.
After Kenya, the Soviets turned their attention to arming and training secessionist and insurgent groups in the region. By late 1963, there were very real fears in the US that the minority of European and American citizens in the Congo were at risk of being slaughtered by the Soviet backed rebels.
Realizing that indirect aid to the inefficient and unstable government in Leopoldville was not going to rectify the situation, Johnson reluctantly made the decision to deploy ground troops to the region on the 2nd of February 1964. These initial deployments were soon joined by small units from South Africa and Rhodesia.
Attempts were also made by the US to coordinate with Portuguese forces in Angola, but Johnson was loathe to openly support a colonial regime and cooperative operations were hamstrung.
Inexperienced in both counterinsurgency and bush conflict, initial US operations in 1964 went very poorly. Despite the widespread use of helicopters to transport ground forces, the US military often found they had immense trouble simply moving their forces around in the dense Congo bush. Malaria, Yellow Fever and Dysentery also began to plague various units. To compensate, the US quickly adopted a brute force approach as ground commanders requested more troops and more airpower to simply flatten the opposition.
This did not solve the problem as, when feeling overmatched by US airpower, many of the Katangese guerrillas simply retreated into neighbouring Zambia and Tanzania where they could receive fresh supplies and fresh training.
US soldiers also complained of poor living conditions, logistical problems and a complete inability to coordinate with local Congolese militia and defence units. In the months of June-September 1964, more US troops died of non-combat causes, including friendly fire, than through enemy action.
On the other end of the spectrum the joint South African/Rhodesia (which also included a number of native Australians) contingent possessed many veterans of the conflicts in Malaya and Kenya. As such, they faired better than their US counterparts and typically operated near the Zambian border where the territory was most familiar to their own. However, since this contingent never numbered more than 1,100 troops it could not have a serious impact on the course of the conflict.
In November 1964, the situation worsened significantly when a US attempt to rescue European hostages failed dramatically leading to the shootdown (and subsequent death) of US paratroops as well as the execution of all the hostages. The Soviets quickly seized on the debacle and the Katangese made a number of gains during the period of November – December 1964.
Fearing a public humiliation of the US military could be imminent, Johnson doubled down on his commitment of troops to the region and 1965 saw a dramatic swell of US men and equipment arrive in the Congo. Airstrikes relentlessly pounded the Congo jungle while ground forces aggressively patrolled troubled regions. During this period, insurgents began to operate in MPLA controlled areas of Angola and the US began to covertly assist the Portuguese.
However, in expanding support to Angola Johnson made a crucial error which would come to haunt him three years later.