Many are indeed “certified” though...
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Would you fly on a Boeing 737 Max?
- Thread starter SpurMeUp
- Start date
SpurMeUp
Les Howe
Do you hold shares in Boeing!?
The investigation has not been published. How are you certain it was the sensor at fault? It may have been related to software and the MACS system noted in the original post. Too early to say.
From the New York Times:
“In the brutally competitive jetliner business, the announcement in late 2010 that Airbus would introduce a more fuel-efficient version of its best-selling A320 amounted to a frontal assault on its archrival Boeing’s workhorse 737.
“Boeing scrambled to counterpunch. Within months, it came up with a plan for an upgrade of its own, the 737 Max, featuring engines that would yield similar fuel savings. And in the years that followed, Boeing pushed not just to design and build the new plane, but to persuade its airline customers and, crucially, the Federal Aviation Administration, that the new model would fly safely and handle enough like the existing model that 737 pilots would not have to undergo costly retraining.”
https://www.google.co.uk/amp/s/www....rld/asia/lion-air-plane-crash-pilots.amp.html
According to this article it looks like it can happen (see end of your post). For now, I’ll take the NYT version of the possibilities over yours. [emoji6]
Sitting on my porcelain throne using glory-glory.co.uk mobile app
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Retraining, not no training. There's a massive difference. Training on a new model of aircraft can take months, training on a modification to an existing model takes hours to days.
This is extremely common in the aviation industry. There are 7 or 8 versions of the 737 alone, 5 versions of the A320 but it's been around for a shorter time.
In fact, this very same design/launch tactic was used by Airbus with the Neo a few years ago. They made almost exactly the same modifications as Boeing did, and required the same amount of familiarisation (not retraining) as the 737.
The sensor is what the MACS system runs from. We know the MACS system itself isn't failing because it's the same system that's been used in thousands of simulator hours.
And yes, as of yesterday I own a fair few Boeing shares - it seems a good time to be picking them up cheaply.
SpurMeUp
Les Howe
Did you read that article? Published before the crash in Ethiopia, it clearly flagged up Boeing’s drive to compete and chase profit, over safety. Article continues:
“But the tragedy has become a focus of intense interest and debate in aviation circles because of another factor: the determination by Boeing and the F.A.A. that pilots did not need to be informed about a change introduced to the 737’s flight control system for the Max, some software coding intended to automatically offset the risk that the size and location of the new engines could lead the aircraft to stall under certain conditions.”
Definitely opportunity to buy Boeing shares - they rebounded after the battery issues a few years back - but it maybe early to buy. As the investigation results are delivered and fall out with the FAA, their shares could dip further.
Sitting on my porcelain throne using glory-glory.co.uk mobile app
No I didn't, because I'd far rather listen to people from within the industry than a non-expert source.
I can tell you categorically, that new passenger aircraft do not go out to airlines without pilot training and familiarisation - not even small upgrades on old models. Whether the individual airlines choose to apply that or not is another matter, but they are legally required to do so.
If you will insist on only listening to the NYT then please read the following:
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/12/reader-center/737-max-8.html
This is what happens at a reputable AOC. Every. Single. Time.
See also (same source):
Not only had pilots been trained for the new model (AOC allowing), but Boeing then sent out further notification to all customers. I asked a friend yesterday if Boeing would have been expected to detail the system and in his words "no, it was an emergency recovery system so unless it's something entirely new to aviation (and this isn't)."
For more of the same see (NASA's ASRS db search is down right now, but this has the report verbatim):
https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2...ecord-about-problems-with-the-737-max/584791/
Take a look at report 1597286.
This report was made in November 2018.
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How come you are so learned and wise in such matters @scaramanga ? Is Aviation a job or a hobby for you?
SpurMeUp
Les Howe
All of that doesn't change the fact (a lot of it backs it up) that Boeing avoided costly pilot retraining by getting the regulators to classify a new aircraft as an iteration. This helped sales but undermined safty. However, we don't know what caused the crashes, just that two of the same type of plane showed similar up and down altitude patterns on take off which could be the MACS system lowering the nose while the pilots raised the nose every 15 seconds. If the crashes were caused by MACS, and these two pilots didn't know how to quickly override it, it shows that 1. the aircraft's MACS system is not fit for purpose and 2. pilot retraining was necessary and probably would have saved lives.
As has happened with almost all single aisle passenger craft for decades now. This isn't new, this isn't Boeing, this is how aircraft are built - it's the industry standard. Without these incremental changes, aircraft would be far less safe than they currently are.
We don't, but we can be fairly sure.
MACS adjusts the trim. If a pilot attempts to combat incorrectly applied trim with yoke he or she will just compound the situation. Automated trim being applied incorrectly is very, very common. All pilots with 100s of hours experience in cattle crates will have had it happen to them - it's one of the quirks of autopilot. The difference here is that the trim is automated when under manual control - that's still no excuse for not noticing the trim moving. It's on a clickwheel next to both the pilot and the copilot, it makes a fudging click when it moves and they should be holding the controls when auto is off. Inattention, lack of training, lack of sleep, laziness, lack of experience - take your pick, but my hours are in the dozens rather than the hundreds and I know the difference between trim and yoke. I'd certainly notice a trim wheel moving of its own accord.
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SpurMeUp
Les Howe
Lion Air pilots were looking at handbook when plane crashed
Sources say flight crew of Indonesian jet tried to find procedure to halt dive
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...s-were-looking-at-handbook-when-plane-crashed
@scaramanga are you sure re-training Pilots for this 737 iteration with MCAS system was not necessary?
The other thing that seems odd, is why software intervenes to dip the nose on take off. Surely software to lower the nose should only lower the nose to a safe assent (or even staying level) why wa MCAS seemingly lowering the nose into decent? Because the sensor was bust and the software was taking the wrong reading? The software thought it was just levelling out the place by x degrees when in fact it was causing the plane to descend? Either way the system is not fit for purpose.
Sources say flight crew of Indonesian jet tried to find procedure to halt dive
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...s-were-looking-at-handbook-when-plane-crashed
@scaramanga are you sure re-training Pilots for this 737 iteration with MCAS system was not necessary?
The other thing that seems odd, is why software intervenes to dip the nose on take off. Surely software to lower the nose should only lower the nose to a safe assent (or even staying level) why wa MCAS seemingly lowering the nose into decent? Because the sensor was bust and the software was taking the wrong reading? The software thought it was just levelling out the place by x degrees when in fact it was causing the plane to descend? Either way the system is not fit for purpose.
There were plenty of crew who had the same issues and knew what to do. In fact, the crew who flew that very same plane on the flight before the ones who crashed it had the problem and worked around it the way any crew should. They then reported the issues, ground staff noted that it was probably a dodgy sensor, but didn't recommend that the plane be grounded until fixed or investigated.
That's the risk you take when you fly garbage airways.
A sensor failing caused the unusual and undesirable behaviour. That doesn't even nearly make the 737 unfit for purpose. Sensors fail all the time - they get hit by birds, ground crew tread on them or pull a hose across them, pollen gets stuck in pitot tubes, the list goes on forever.
You can argue that another sensor (or even two) would be desirable, but this is just how aircraft development works. Things happen in complex systems and engineers simply cannot predict all of them. Testing doesn't reveal all of them - you only see the full effect when thousands of hours are flown by thousands of craft.
There's a simple workaround for runaway trim, there has been ever since autopilot went into production. There's also no excuse for missing runaway trim - here's a video of 737 trim wheels:
Even assuming the Lion Air crew weren't expected to know how to deal with runaway trim, Boeing put out a safety memorandum directly after that crash at the end of last year. It very clearly stated the scenarios under which MCAS might activate and the actions it might take when activated.
Any airline whose crew weren't familiar with that memorandum should not hold a license.
Kenyan Spur
Peter Taylor
Interesting.
Watch this space!!
Watch this space!!
thfcsteff
George Hunt
Appalling. Boeing need to be called to carpet. Safety should never be an "optional extra"...
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/...xVaUiuzmkbqaVO1A7olkmw2h2ObiT7fh_bkBW8aAppjkg
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/...xVaUiuzmkbqaVO1A7olkmw2h2ObiT7fh_bkBW8aAppjkg
Really?
Ever bought a car that didn't have run-flat tyres? They're an optional extra.
Ever bought a Mercedes? They have a virtually self-driving system that improves safety but is an optional extra.
Ever bought a set of chef-standard kitchen knives? A safety sheath for them will cost extra.
I assume your house has fire alarms. Does it have a full fire suppression system? That's safety being an optional extra.
SpurMeUp
Les Howe
Difference is you don't drop out the sky to your death without these above features. That two planes did, in this day and age of safety and regulation, makes Boeing and the AFF look incompetent. What is worse than building an unsafe plane? Building one where you knowingly withold crucial safety features that could have saved lives.
Let's take run flat tyres as an analogy then - I picked it intentionally.
If a tyre blows on the motorway and you have run flats then you're fine. If a tyre blows and you don't, but you ease off the gas and steer into the skid with smooth movements and slowly reduce speed, you're fine. If you panic, stamp on the brakes and throw the wheel in the opposite direction, you're probably going to end up hurt or dead.
The same goes for flying a 737 Max. If you turn off the Stab trim then you can carry on flying without any issue. One of the greatest positives (often labelled a weakness) of the 737 is that it's 50 years old. Underneath all the computers, it's still a fly by wire, pilot-controlled aircraft that acts in the most predictable way possible. All one has to do is turn off the artificial aids and it flies in the most simple way possible - a kid with 100 hours on Flight Sim could keep it straight and level on manual control.
SpurMeUp
Les Howe
Except when software takes over and crashes you into the earth at ____mph. How fast are they travelling? Would you prefer to be in a car with a blown tyre of in a jet traveling at x miles per hour into solid land? I don't think you can reasonably compare the two.
The fact that 2 planes didn't manage to turn off MCAS suggests there is a problem with 1. the faulty system which on take off leaves little time to act and 2. the decision to not re-train pilots so they fully understood what MCAS was doing.
1 there was plenty of time, the flight radars of both have been published. MCAS works in 5 second cycles - any one (or two for the more cognitively challenged out there) of those cycles is long enough to turn it off.
2. Pilots didn't need retraining. Ever since autopilot and artificial stabilisation was introduced (decades ago), the answer to the aircraft not responding to your input is to switch off all the artificial aids. That's what other pilots have done thousands of times under similar circumstances, it's what the crew of the very same Lion Air plane on the very flight before the crash did. They even logged it in the fudging maintenance books, but captain godtard obviously thought there was no need to read them.
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