Trying to use semantics, nice try. But the fact is using the thumb trim is exactly what the pilots tried, MCAS overrode it. It is well documented.
I'm not sure what claims you've seen that the pilots were using thumb trim, because the flight data I've seen suggest that they only started trying that once the trim was heavily down (around 9 MCAS cycles).
Only way to override MCAS was to turn off all electronic trim systems and use the manual trim wheel.
Again, I think you've misunderstood.
The only way to turn off MCAS was to turn off all electronic trim (which they should have done after the second MCAS cycle), but it could be overridden in every cycle with the thumb trim.
As you’ve said there was nothing feasible the pilots could have done. I was thinking they could have tried a ‘hack’ - use the thumb control to adjust the trim then quickly turn off the electronics systems before MCAS overrode their input.
There's nothing they could have done once they'd let the aircraft get completely out of control, yes that's obviously the case. They had plenty of opportunity (as other pilots previously had) to stop it ever getting that far.
But without know what MACS was and how it works, with limited time and altitude to ply with, that was nye on impossible.
They should have known what MCAS was, you're right. After Lion Air, Boeing put out an updated protocol that reinforced the existing measures to deal with runaway trim (again, standard procedure). Not much Boeing can do if the airline doesn't update manuals and the pilots don't take their time to learn them.
Even worse than that, the pilot didn't even need to know what MCAS was to know how to deal with it.
MCAS is runaway trim. Admittedly an unusual and specific form of runaway trim, but runaway trim it is. There's been a method of dealing with runaway trim in Boeings ever since automatic trim first started showing up decades ago - turn it off. That's how all other forms of runaway trim are dealt with, that's how MCAS is dealt with.
When training for a particular aircraft there are two types of routines or procedures a pilot learns - written and memory. Both come with a simple 3-6 step instruction card, but the memory ones are (unsurprisingly) supposed to be committed to memory. Runaway trim is a memory procedure. There isn't a (properly trained) 737 pilot in the world who cannot repeat that procedure by rote in about 3 seconds. They can do it with the roosterpit lights in failure state whilst being shaken around like the contents of a good roostertail.
Now, even before that diagnosis was made.....
The pilots had a stick shaker when the sensor failed. If you're still on ascent when a stick shaker happens (they were) then there are three things you absolutely must do, in the following order.
- Keep speed low (I'm guessing in a 737 that's around 50-60% thrust)
- Keep flaps down
- Radio the tower and return to where you left
Care to guess how many of those the EA pilots got right?
At low thrust, MCAS is revsersible.
With the flaps down, MCAS can't engage.
The EA pilots did neither of these things. Many have suggested it's part of the untrained pilot's need to get into autopilot territory as quickly as possible. I won't comment there but it wouldn't surprise me.
That your 737 pilot pal supposedly thought you could override MACS with the thumb control suggests it was not only ‘garbage airways’ that weren’t equipped to deal with a faulty sensor and MACS.
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I still don't think you understand. MCAS can
only work
between uses of thumb trim. Simply touching the thumb trim will disable that round of MCAS every time. So a pilot constantly using thumb trim (as all good pilots do) would never have let it get into that mess.
Your argument here is like claiming that a clutch can't stop an engine. You're right that it can't, but it can override the actions of the engine until you remember the really simple, long-standing instructions about how to turn off the engine.