http://www.eplindex.com/31750/tottenham-1-southampton-0-indepth-tactical-analysis.html?
I was impressed by this detailed piece, in particular its exploration of Pochettino's thinking behind Southampton's purposeful 4-2-2-2 structure against us and their resemblance to Emirates Marketing Project's shape. Some points I've highlighted:
On Saints:
On Tottenham:
I'd encourage everyone to read the whole thing. What stands out is how well-prepared Southampton were in comparison to us - we couldn't even get the broad strokes right (a front quartet of 'consumers' - what I've called 'point men' - who average 20 passes per game will NEVER be a proper attacking platform) but the Saints executed the minor tactical details all over the pitch perfectly - with discipline in the correct places and fluid, expressive movement in others.
This is what I'm hoping we'll be seeing from AVB next season if/once he gets to create a more balanced, more intelligent (please GHod) squad this summer. I've heard him bring up the issues of ball circulation, over-loading, and 'surprise runs from deep' before in interviews - and this piece also gives credit to AVB's changes through the game - so I have no doubt he sees and thinks HARD about these things. We just need to claw our way through these next three cup finals and get to the point where we have the space to experiment and practice and drill these things into us.
I was impressed by this detailed piece, in particular its exploration of Pochettino's thinking behind Southampton's purposeful 4-2-2-2 structure against us and their resemblance to Emirates Marketing Project's shape. Some points I've highlighted:
On Saints:
[Spurs'] front four were all ‘consumers’, the midfielders were ‘direct’ players (either in terms of passing – Huddlestone; or in terms of all-round actions – Dembele) with only the centre-backs capable to offer some sort of a ball-retention. It was hard to imagine how Villas-Boas’s players would offer sustained passing flow, geared up towards putting the opposition under sustained passing pressure as a form of main attacking approach.
Walker was the obvious candidate to exploit better the fact Shaw was sticking tight on Lennon also due to the fact Lallana often ventured infield and left him completely free initially. But even for that possibility Southampton seemed prepared. When Lallana was out of position to initially deal with Walker, there was always player who rushed to cover that zone. Often this was Rodriguez, as whenever Lallana cut infield to try and overload the right flank, Rodriguez tried to push forward from his deep starting position and sneak into the blind side over the left channel. But few times Davis used his energetic nature to quickly close down Walker with one of Rodriguez or Lallana, whomever was nearer, dropped in his position through the middle.
However, one of the key aspects of Southampton’s out of possession play was the roles executed by Lambert and Rodriguez – the split centre-forwards. With Pochettino’s aim to have his defensive line and midfield duo deeper to squeeze the space, it was more or less impossible for the team to press as fiercely and as high up the pitch as usual. Instead the centre-forwards were asked to position themselves between Spurs’ centre-backs and midfielders, cutting off the easy path of the ball between these players. With Southampton being compact and geared up towards flooding the midfield area it was that zone where the players pressed actively. Only sporadically one of Lambert but often Rodriguez gone on to close down the centre-backs and force them into rushed passes which often end up misplaced or out of play. It seemed for Southampton it was more important to cut the link between the centre-backs and the midfielders in order to slow down the play and further nullify Spurs’ threats, as without the ball they wouldn’t be in position provide any danger, than press the home team’s back four in order to limit the time they had on the ball.
It was due to that slowing down process Lallana and Clyne had enough time to drop back in position and form that tiered 4-2-2-2 formation without the ball which perfectly mirrored and occupied Spurs’ 4-2-3-1 (which was more like 4-2-4 with the front four staying higher up and Bale acting as a second forward, not third midfielder).
The forward duo was split vertically with Rodriguez playing off Lambert with the duo levelling only when Lambert dropped deeper when out of possession to help cut off the link between Spurs’ centre-backs and midfielders. When in possession the duo, as part of the overall front quartet, was much more fluid. Both players started in deeper, hence their ability to join up the build-up play and link the team through the middle. But once the play was transitioned higher up and near Spurs defensive third, the whole attacking unit started to roam all over the place, interchanging and having one simple aim – to exploit Spurs’ high defensive line.
A usual pattern of play was to see Lambert dropping deep and to the right, allowing Rodriguez to then sneak forward from deep. Meanwhile it was interesting to see Lallana, from his wide left position, moving across the whole pitch to end up towards the right channel. In that movement he very much resembled David Silva’s movement for the Emirates Marketing Project team. The similarities between the usual Emirates Marketing Project attacking pattern of play and what Southampton displayed here don’t end up here though. At City (especially when the team is playing with Milner on the right and the Tevez-Aguero duo in attack) Silva is moving across to the right flank to allow the initially deeper Tevez (see Rodriguez) to sneak in behind with Milner (see Do Prado) to start move infield from his deeper on the right flank position.
Southampton was clearly geared up to overload Spurs’ left flank in the same way Emirates Marketing Project are usually doing . . . Throughout the game there were several mini-situations similar to these two, with Southampton successfully retaining the ball, giving time for the players to overload the right side of the pitch before sending an off ball runner threatening to exploit Spurs’ high defensive line.
On Tottenham:
With Rodriguez and Lambert cutting off the link between the centre-backs and the midfielders, both Dembele and Huddlestone didn’t see much of the ball. As a result Spurs’ vital link that was expected to pick up the ball and feed the front quartet was largely missing. Statistically, Dembele (9) and Huddlestone (12) in combine (21) received the ball less than Assoue-Ekotto (27) or Walker (24) alone during the period a change in the overall setup of Spurs occurred (ie before Dembele to go off injured). What’s more is the majority of the passes the midfielders received were around the central line. This could be attributed to the high defensive line the team played with, but given how Southampton’s forward were effective in their ‘suffocating’ job it was to be expected one of the midfielders to offer increased roaming movement to try and present themselves as ‘open’ passing angles. . . .
The general route of the home team, given how well the midfielders were occupied and how poor they managed to deal with it, to bring the ball out was to feed the fullbacks. The problem was that it came on the back of dwelling on the ball from the centre-backs or only after a few passes exchanged between Vertonghen and Dawson. Logically, by the time the fullbacks got the ball Southampton’s wingers were already in their intended positions within the 4-2-2-2 shape and the Spurs’ midfielders and front players were largely occupied and denied any space. As a result even as receiving the ball most often than anyone else, Essou-Ekotto (received the ball 56 times) and Walker (received the ball 45 times) simply passed the ball sideways or backwards.
The other problem main problem wasn’t in relation to how well Southampton’s nullifying tactics were working. It was to do with the nature of the home team’s attacking players. The four of Dempsey, Bale, Lennon and Defoe are all players who are generally unwilling to join the build-up phase by going into sequences of passing combinations geared up towards moving the ball higher up the pitch smoothly with the team moving as a unit. All of them are players who are principally waiting the ball to reach them in order to run with it (Bale, Lennon) or as quickly as possible finish the whole team move (Dempsey, Defoe). With the team having so much difficulties bringing the ball out of the back four into a meaningful way it was to be expected the front players to start drop deep, coming towards the play and offer themselves as a passing angles. But neither of them did so and it was even harder for the home team to work around both the marking patterns and the solid positioning displayed by Southampton.
I'd encourage everyone to read the whole thing. What stands out is how well-prepared Southampton were in comparison to us - we couldn't even get the broad strokes right (a front quartet of 'consumers' - what I've called 'point men' - who average 20 passes per game will NEVER be a proper attacking platform) but the Saints executed the minor tactical details all over the pitch perfectly - with discipline in the correct places and fluid, expressive movement in others.
This is what I'm hoping we'll be seeing from AVB next season if/once he gets to create a more balanced, more intelligent (please GHod) squad this summer. I've heard him bring up the issues of ball circulation, over-loading, and 'surprise runs from deep' before in interviews - and this piece also gives credit to AVB's changes through the game - so I have no doubt he sees and thinks HARD about these things. We just need to claw our way through these next three cup finals and get to the point where we have the space to experiment and practice and drill these things into us.